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ABSTRACT
The Jobs Act was enacted to promote efficient access to external capital by
small businesses. Title III of the Jobs Act offers small businesses the chance of
efficient financial intermediation through crowdfunding. The crowdfunding exemption is
not self-executing but, instead, requires regulatory implementation by the SEC.
The Commission’s first iteration of its crowdfunding rules fails to offer small
businesses efficient access to external capital. Principally, this is because the
proposed crowdfunding rules: (1) require excessive disclosures, especially regarding
smaller crowdfunding offerings; (2) fail to offer small businesses relying on the
crowdfunding exemption two-way safe harbor integration protection; and (3) fail to
protect small businesses from the loss of the crowdfunding exemption as the result of
the financial intermediary’s failure to meet its statutory and regulatory obligations.
The problems can be fixed by the Commission by revising its proposed
crowdfunding regulations, thereby fulfilling its broad and ubiquitous obligation to
balance capital formation and investor protection.
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February 14, 2014
Submitted electronically to rule-comments@sec.gov
Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549
Re: Rulemaking under Title III of the Jobs Act
Dear Ms. Murphy:
I write to offer comments on the proposed crowdfunding regulations
implementing Title III of the Jobs Act (the Crowdfunding Act), as announced in the
Commission’s Release 33-9470 (Oct. 23, 2013) .
A. Overview of My Comments
Title III of the Jobs Act, the Crowdfunding Act, is intended to provide a statutory
structure within which small companies are able to raise a relatively modest amount of
capital through unregistered offerings conducted over the internet.
The fundamentals of the Crowdfunding Act are sound. The Act offers the
Commission the opportunity to construct a new exemption from registration that may
enable small businesses to solicit broadly and efficiently for external capital through the
use of modern technology. The Act provides the Commission a rational (albeit
challenging) framework for a disclosure regime that balances the capital formation
needs of small issuers with the need for investor protection in connection with the
offering of securities. The Act does not, either as a matter of language or practical
effect, limit investors to accredited investors, and the Act enables small businesses to
solicit for external capital free from the debilitating effect of state registration laws and
regulations.
The Crowdfunding Act delegates broad authority to the Commission to
implement the Act through regulations.
For the Commission’s crowdfunding regulations to work – to provide an
appropriate access to external capital for small businesses – relative offering costs
(offering costs as a percentage of proceeds from the offering) in crowdfunding
transactions must be at a level that is rational and economically efficient. High relative
offering costs will simply price the crowdfunding exemption out of reach for small
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businesses.1
The Commission has now promulgated its first iteration of proposed
crowdfunding regulations,2 and I fear those regulations fail to offer small businesses an
efficient and balanced regulatory exemption.
Three parts of the proposed crowdfunding regulations need attention and
revision:
(1) The required ex ante disclosures (disclosures required at the time of
the crowdfunding offering) and the required ex post disclosures (disclosures
required subsequent to the crowdfunding offer) must be reduced, especially in
the case of small crowdfunding offerings (e.g., offerings of less than $500,000).
(2) The crowdfunding exemption must be protected from integration by a
two-way safe harbor regulation.
(3) Issuers should not be at risk to loose the crowdfunding exemption
because of an intermediary’s failure to meet its statutory or regulatory
obligations.
Without these adjustments the purpose of the Crowdfunding Act – which is to
provide small businesses with efficient and low cost financial intermediation in a setting
that offers appropriate levels of protection to investors – will not be accomplished.
Without adjustments, relative offering costs will foreclose many small businesses from
using the crowdfunding exemption for small offerings.
B. Revision of Disclosure Obligations
Setting the efficient level of mandatory disclosure for the crowdfunding
exemption is certainly the most difficult decision for the Commission in connection with
its crowdfunding regulations.
There are two disclosure obligations in the proposed crowdfunding regulations:
the ex ante obligation, which is the obligation to provide investment information at the
point of offer and sale, and the ex post obligation, which is the obligation to provide
continuing information after the offering is completed.
Considering first the ex ante disclosure obligations, one finds, depending on how
1

It is relative offering costs that preclude small issuers from accessing external capital.
Relative offering costs are offering costs compared to the total size of the offering. To use
extreme examples, offering costs of $100,000 will preclude a company from offering a total of
$100,000 in its securities. Offering costs of $100,000, however, will not preclude a company
from offering $50 million in its securities. Because the capital needs of small businesses are
small, relative offering costs are necessarily high and thus more likely to preclude a small
business from acquiring external capital.
2

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 5. 2013) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts.
200,227, 232, 239 and 249).
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one counts, that the proposed crowdfunding regulations require issuers to provide the
Commission and investors with approximately twenty categories of financial and nonfinancial investment information.3 I see in these requirements soaring relative offering
costs – especially for offerings of less than $500,000 – generated by the amount and,
at least in some cases, the nature of information that is required to be disclosed and by
the practical necessity of the issuer’s engaging expensive professionals in constructing
the required disclosures. In short, I am unable in the case of small offerings to find in
the proposed crowdfunding regulations an efficient regulatory balance between small
business capital formation and investor protection.
The sheer volume, detail and practical complexity of this ex ante disclosure of
information is perhaps even more vivid and thus daunting when viewed through the lens
of one who has written disclosure documents required by the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Act of 1934. A few of examples out of the twenty or so categories of
information will illustrate this point. Risk factors must be disclosed,4 and initially
identifying the issuer’s risk factors and constructing the required disclosures is a matter
that necessarily will involve significant time from the issuer’s counsel.5 Required
disclosures about “ownership and capital structure” are especially challenging.6 Six
separate disclosures are required, including how the rights of principal shareholders
could impact crowdfunding investors,7 “[h]ow the [crowdfunding] securities . . . are being
valued, and examples of methods for how such securities may be valued by the issuer
in the future, including subsequent corporate actions,”8 and a description of the special
risks of minority ownership.9 Finally, there is the obligation for a narrative “description
3

17 C.F.R. § 227.201(a)-(v) (2013).
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17 C.F.R. § 227.201(f) (2013).
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One practical point regarding the costs of meeting the crowdfunding disclosures should
be made. It is likely a small business utilizing the crowdfunding exemption will be an
unseasoned issuer – one that for the first time is preparing offering documents required by
securities regulators. This makes it likely that outside counsel will literally draft the whole of the
disclosures rather than – as is typical in an offering by a seasoned issuer – merely reviewing the
work of the issuer itself. This significantly increases attorney fees for the crowdfunding issuer.
Drafting risk disclosures provides an example of this. A seasoned issuer, one for example that is
reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, can simply update and revise as necessary
its “Risk Factors” section from a prior Commission filing. Such a low cost disclosure is
impossible in a crowdfunding offering.
6

17 C.F.R. § 227.201(m) (2013).
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17 C.F.R. § 227.201(m)(2) (2013).
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17 C.F.R. § 227.201(m)(4) (2013). This disclosure will involve complex present value
calculations and an understanding and disclosure of future reorganizations and how such
transactions may impact shareholder wealth.
9

17 C.F.R. § 227.201(m)(5) (2013) requires disclosure of “[t]he risks . . . to minority
ownership in the issuer and the risks associated with corporate actions including additional
issuances of securities, issuer repurchases of securities, a sale of the issuer or of assets of the
issuer or transactions with related parties.”
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of the financial condition of the issuer,”10 a requirement that seems to be a first cousin
to the “Management’s Discussion and Analysis”11 required, for example, in Form 10-Ks
that are filed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12
The ex ante disclosures required by the proposed crowdfunding regulations also
include financial statements.13 The financial statements provided to investors and the
Commission must “[i]nclude a balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash
flows and statement of changes in owners’ equity and notes to financial statements
prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles,” and the
financial statements must cover at least two years or since the inception of the
company.14 The Commission’s crowdfunding regulations, consistent with the
Crowdfunding Act,15 offer a modest stepped approach to the certification or audit
requirements of these financial statements. For offerings of $100,000 or less, the
statements must be “certified by the principal executive officer of the issuer to be true
and complete in all material respects;” for offerings between $100,000 and $500,000,
the statements must be “reviewed by a public accountant who is independent of the
issuer,” and for offerings between $500,000 and $1,000,000, the financial statements
must be “audited by a public accountant who is independent of the issuer”.16
The burden of the foregoing ex ante required narrative and financial disclosures
is significantly increased by the obligation in the proposed crowdfunding regulations17
for the issuer to provide ex post disclosures – extensive and protracted post-offering
disclosures that seem modeled on the periodic disclosures under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. These ex post disclosures raise total offering costs and may, in
fact, be the most daunting of all disclosures for small businesses seeking to use the
crowdfunding exemption. Essentially, the issuer is required annually to provide all the
information – including financial information – required ex ante at the point of offering,
except for information about the nature and terms of the original offering.18 This

10

17 C.F.R. § 227.201(s) (2013).

11

17 C.F.R. §229.303 (2013).

12

17 C.F.R. § 249.310, Item 7 (2013).

13

17 C.F.R. § 227.201(t) (2013).

14

17 C.F.R. § 227.201(t)(Instr. 2) (2013).

15

15 U.S.C. § 77dA(b)(1)(D) (2013).

16

17 C.F.R. § 227.201(t)(1)-(3) (2013).

17

The Crowdfunding Act delegates broad authority to the Commission to dictate the terms
of this annual reporting obligation. 15 U.S.C. § 77dA(b)4)(2013) (obligation to file such annual
reports “as the Commission shall by rule determine appropriate, subject to such exceptions and
termination dates as the Commission may establish, by rule . . . .”).
18

17 C.F.R. § 227.202(a) (2013).
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periodic reporting may go on forever.19
It is difficult to see how any small issuer would knowingly agree to such terms. It
is even more difficult to see any policy supporting such an extensive and protracted
obligation. In short, the ex post disclosure obligations are significantly out of balance.
The purpose here is not to provide a detailed, section by section analysis of the
disclosure requirements for a crowdfunding offering. The purpose, instead, is to
provide a few of the more glaring examples of the Commission’s loss of balance in its
crowdfunding regulations.
The Commission in its first iteration of its crowdfunding regulations has failed to
appreciate the impact on small issuers of the relative offering costs generated by the
crowdfunding disclosure obligations.
For the new crowdfunding exemption to work, the Commission must step these
disclosure requirements, requiring less disclosures for small crowdfunding offerings and
more disclosures for larger crowdfunding offerings. Absent such a stepped approach,
the crowdfunding exemption will be functionally unavailable for many offerings.
Especially adversely impacted by the failure of the Commission to adopt such a
stepped approach will be offerings by small businesses with small external capital
needs, which seems exactly counter to the whole purpose of the Jobs Act.
C. Integration Safe Harbor
Another cost for issuers relying on the crowdfunding exemption is in the nature of
an opportunity cost and is principally the result of the impact of that old and sinister
concept of integration.20
The terms of the Crowdfunding Act require that the “issuer . . . . shall . . .not
advertise the terms of the offering, except for notices which direct investors to the
funding portal or broker.”21 The proposed crowdfunding regulations reiterate this
statutory prohibition, limiting the issuer’s right to communicate with investors to
“communication channels provided by the intermediary on the intermediary’s platform . .
. .”22
On its face, this limitation seems consistent with the balance struck by the
crowdfunding exemption. Part of the investor protection for crowdfunding investors is
19

17 C.F.R. § 227.202(b) (2013) (issuer is obligated to continue the annual filing until the
issuer becomes a reporting company under the 1934 Act, the issuer or a third party purchases all
the securities issued in the crowdfunding offering, or the issuer dissolves itself).
20

See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Overwhelming Case for Elimination of the
Integration Doctrine Under the Securities Act of 1933, 89 KY . L. J. 289 (2001) (hereinafter,
Campbell, Integration Doctrine).
21

15 U.S.C. § 77dA(b)(2)(2013).

22

17 C.F.R. § 227.204(c)(2013).
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this limit on aggressive selling efforts by the intermediary or the issuer. The Act and the
crowdfunding regulations, therefore, essentially limit permissible selling efforts to the
electronic posting of the offering and providing potential investors with disclosures of
prescribed investment information.
The problem with this, however, is that this tough limitation on selling strategies,
when considered together with the integration doctrine, may generate significant
opportunity costs for an issuer attempting to utilize the crowdfunding exemption. In
essence, it forecloses a small business issuer utilizing the crowdfunding exemption
from the opportunity to market its securities in face-to-face transactions, even with local,
accredited potential investors.
Consider, for example, a situation in which an issuer needs to raise $1 million in
external capital. If the issuer undertakes a crowdfunding offering in that case, it could
not engage in any face-to-face selling efforts with potential investors in the issuer’s
community. To do so would likely be contrary to the limitation on selling efforts,
described above. Even if all the local potential investors were, for example, accredited
investors and thus qualified as investors under Rule 506, offering and selling shares to
such accredited investors would likely violate Section 5 of the 1933 Act and destroy the
crowdfunding exemption as well. The reason is because of the integration doctrine. It
seems certain that the two components of the $1 million dollar offering – the part of the
offering sold on the internet through the crowdfunding exemption and the part of the
offering sold in face-to-face transactions to accredited investors – would be integrated.23
If that happens, the integrated offering would meet neither the requirements of the
crowdfunding offering – since the issuer would seem to violate the crowdfunding
prohibition against advertising – nor the requirements for the exemption provided by
Rule 506 – since the offering would include sales to unaccredited investors over the
internet.
The result of this for the small business issuer is that it would have to choose
between an internet offering and a face-to-face offering, and that would be a significant
disadvantage for a small business struggling to raise capital. Importantly, requiring the
issuer to choose between crowdfunding and a Rule 506 offering advances no economic
or social policy, such as investor protection.
Integration, as I have argued in prior articles, has never made any sense. If a
crowdfunding offer is made, the bases for an exemption from registration are
disclosures and the limitation on aggressive selling techniques. The fact that at the
same time the issuer is also engaged in selling securities to accredited investors under
Rule 506 in no way harms or compromises the underlying policy of the crowdfunding
exemption. Nor do the crowdfunding sales compromise the underlying policy of the
exemption provided by Rule 506, which is primarily based on the fact that all

23

Regulation D has its own integration safe harbor. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2013). That
safe harbor, however, offers only one way protection. That is, it protects only the Regulation D
offering and not, in the case I am hypothesizing, the crowdfunding offering. Also, the Regulation
D integration safe harbor protects only in instances where the two offerings are six months or
more apart.
8

purchasers are accredited.24
The Commission has over time seemed to recognize the lack of any policy
supporting the application of the integration concept and thus developed a number of
integration safe harbors.25 The crowdfunding regulations and the accompanying release
proposing those regulations, however, are woefully lacking in regard to this important
matter. The Commission simply ignored this issue in its proposed crowdfunding
regulations by providing no integration safe harbor protection for crowdfunding.
Instead, curiously and inappropriately, the Commission in the release proposing the
crowdfunding regulations merely states what is apparently its opinion that “we believe”
there should be no integration.26
The Commission needs a crowdfunding regulation providing a complete two-way
integration safe harbor for all crowdfunding offerings. Efficient access to capital for a
small business issuer using the crowdfunding exemption requires that the small
business at the same time be allowed to deal with potential investors in a face-to-face
manner.27
D. Protection from the Intermediary’s Regulatory Failures
Small business issuers relying on the exemption provided by the proposed
crowdfunding regulation will also encounter the costs generated by the risk that the
financial intermediary involved in the crowdfunding transaction is not compliant with the
Crowdfunding Act and the crowdfunding regulations. Both the Act itself and the
crowdfunding regulations predicate the crowdfunding exemption on a “transaction [that]
is conducted through [an intermediary] . . . that complies with the requirements of . . .”
the Crowdfunding Act.28
The impact of this will require the issuer to take steps to ensure that the
intermediary has complied with all the steps necessary to meet the requirement of a
“broker” or a “funding portal”. The amount of investigation the issuer takes in order to
ensure that the intermediary is compliant with the Crowdfunding Act will certainly be
based on a cost benefit analysis by the small business issuer. The cost to the small
business issuer will include both the out of pocket expenses of any investigation and
the residual negative value remaining after investigation that, notwithstanding the
investigation, the intermediary does not actually meet the statutory requirements. Both
24

Campbell, Integration Doctrine, supra note 20, at 319-324 (providing examples
demonstrating the nonsense of applying integration in exempt offerings).
25

For a discussion of the Commission’s regulatory integration safe harbors, see Campbell,
Integration Doctrine, supra note 20, at 311-319.
26

Release No. 33-9470, p. 18 (Oct. 23, 2013).

27

The Commission in its release proposing the crowdfunding regulations offered an
approach to integration that could be helpful in developing a safe harbor. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed.
Reg. 66,428, 66,432 (Nov. 5. 2013).
28

15 U.S.C. § 77d(6)(C) (2013);17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3) (2013).
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amount to economic costs that must be absorbed by the issuer.
The Commission should eliminate or significantly reduce this cost through its
crowdfunding regulations.29 Society gains essentially nothing by encouraging issuer
expenditures to audit intermediary regulatory compliance. Intermediary compliance
with the its statutory and regulatory obligations is best and most efficiently achieved by
penalties on the intermediary for its compliance failures. Penalties on issuers for
intermediary non-compliance are misdirected and unnecessarily increase relative
offering costs for small businesses relying the crowdfunding exemption.
E. Conclusions
For the Crowdfunding Act to accomplish the goal of providing small business
issuers an efficient access to external capital, the Commission must adjust its balance
in the crowdfund disclosure requirements, providing a stepped disclosure regime that
requires less disclosure for smaller crowdfund offers. The Commission also should
provide an effective safe harbor from integration and offer small business issuers
protection in the case of regulatory failures by an intermediary. These changes would
help to provide inexpensive financial intermediation for small business issuers while at
the same time appropriately providing protection for investors.
Sincerely,

Rutheford B Campbell, Jr.
Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law

University of Kentucky
College of Law
Lexington, Kentucky 40506
(859) 257-4050

29

The proposed crowdfunding regulations provide that there will be no loss of the
crowdfunding exemption for an “insignificant” violation of the conditions for the exemption. 17
C.F.R. § 227.502 (2013). While this provision is inadequate to provide issuers with needed
protection, it may offer a sensible approach. For example, the Commission by regulation could
provide that the issuer will not lose the crowdfunding exemption for the intermediary’s
regulatory failures, provided the issuer is acting in “good faith”. Issuer “good faith” could be
defined to be met by a certification by the intermediary to the issuer that the intermediary has met
all of its statutory and regulatory requirements.
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